ABSTRACT is paper presents the first probabilistic Byzantine Agreement algorithm whose communication and time complexities are poly-logarithmic. So far, the most effective probabilistic Byzantine Agreement algorithm had communication complexityÕ n and time complexityÕ (1). Our algorithm is based on a novel, unbalanced, almost everywhere to everywhere Agreement protocol which is interesting in its own right.
Randomized algorithms.
To circumvent these lower bounds on time and communication complexities, randomization is crucial. Randomized Byzantine Agreement algorithms with constant expected time complexity were first proposed in [Rab83, DPPU86] . In [PR10] , an algorithm with constant expected time complexity andÕ n 2 communication² complexity was proposed, under the assumption that communication channels are private. is algorithm works for asynchronous systems, but tolerates only t < n /4 malicious nodes.
In [HKK08] , the authors proved an Ω 3 n lower bound on both message (for at least one node) and time complexities for Byzantine Agreement algorithms in synchronous systems, under some restrictive assumptions.
Almost-everywhere agreement.
A relaxed version of the Byzantine Agreement problem, namely the almost-everywhere Byzantine Agreement problem, was introduced by Dwork et al. in [DPPU86] . is problem is a relaxation of the classical Byzantine Agreement problem, in the sense that it only requires that all but an O log −1 n fraction of the nodes agree on a common output.
is problem was first efficiently solved in [KSSV06] , in which the authors proposed an algorithm whose message and computation complexity are poly-logarithmic in n for each node, and so is the number of rounds required. Later, an efficient almost-everywhere reduction (construction of Byzantine Agreement from almost-everywhere Byzantine Agreement) was proposed in [KS09, KLST11] , usingÕ n bits per node and poly-logarithmic time. is yields an algorithm for Byzantine Agreement with the same complexity, which, up to our knowl-²Õ is the same as O up to a poly-logarithmic factor. edge, was the most efficient Byzantine Agreement protocol in terms of communication complexity until the present paper.
Our contribution.
We propose a new almost-everywhere to everywhere algorithm with amortized communication complexityÕ (1) per node, denoted AER. Its time complexity is constant for synchronous executions, with nonrushing Byzantine nodes (defined in Section 2.1), and O log n log log n for asynchronous ones. Composed with an almost-everywhere agreement protocol (along the lines of [KSSV06] ), this yields the most effective protocol for Byzantine Agreement to date, using poly-logarithmic communication and time; this novel protocol is denoted BA.
e high-level idea underlying AER is the following: each node starts with a candidate string. e hypothesis is that more than half of the nodes are both correct and have the same candidate string, i.e. the correct one. Each node starts to diffuse its candidate string during a first phase (called push phase, Section 3.1.1). en in a second phase (pull phase, Section 3.1.2), the bogus strings are discarded so that each node keeps only the correct string. e originality of our protocol, compared to previous ones, is that we relax load-balancing and we introduce new sampler properties so as to reduce communication complexity.
Comparison with existing protocols.
e complexity of push-pull protocols³, like [KLST11] , is dictated by the complexity of the first phase and the size of the candidate lists it produces.
To yield a more efficient protocol (in communication), we propose a solution to limit the total number of candidate strings in the whole system, and a way to diffuse them at a lower cost. Moreover, we introduce a way for each node to filter push requests. However, a Byzantine adversary can seize control of several Input Quorums⁴, associated to a few nodes, and force these nodes to verify an almost-linear number of strings: as such, AER is not load-balanced.
AER has additional properties that are quite distinctive:
• this algorithm remains correct and efficient under asynchrony;
• unlike many randomized protocols, success is guaranteed when there is no Byzantine fault;
• against a non-rushing adversary, the algorithm terminates in constant expected time.
BA is, up to our knowledge, the first Byzantine Agreement protocol with poly-logarithmic complexity in both time and communication. 
Roadmap.
We introduce our model and some background notions in Section 2. Section 3 describes our protocol and Section 4 describes its analysis. We discuss some future work in Section 5.
³Push-pull protocols are defined more precisely in Section 2.3 ⁴Quorums are defined in Section 2.2 
2. PRELIMINARIES
Model
We consider the model of Lamport, Shostak & Peace's original Byzantine Agreement paper [LSP82] , further used in [KS09, KLST11] : a fully-connected network of n nodes with an adversary controlling t nodes.
Unlike these papers, we assume the network to be asynchronous, except in Lemma 8 and Lemma 9. We also require that each node possesses a private random number generator.
An event is said to occur with high probability (w.h.p.) iff it occurs with probability greater than 1 − O n −3 .
Network.
e network is fully-connected, and communication channels are authenticated -the identity of the sender is known to the recipient; transferable authentication is not required, nor any weaker form of nonequivocation. However, we require the network to be reliable: a message sent (to a non-faulty node) will be eventually delivered. In the synchronous case, we also assume that a message sent during round r will be delivered during round r + 1.
Adversary.
A node controlled by the adversary is called Byzantine and can deviate arbitrarily from the algorithm. Furthermore, the adversary has full knowledge of the network and can coordinate the nodes it controls.
In particular, the actions of Byzantine nodes can depend on any messages sent, especially those sent by correct nodes. Two variations are considered:
• A rushing adversary knows the messages sent by the correct nodes at a given time step before choosing which messages to send.
• A non-rushing adversary chooses the messages it sends at a given time step independently of the messages sent by the correct nodes during the same time step.
e results we present assume some arbitrary ϵ > 0 is fixed, and (3 + ϵ) · t < n; however other bounds on t are used and mentioned for related work. It is also assumed that 1 /2 + ϵ fraction of the nodes are both correct and know a common string g string , taken with uniform probability. is is equivalent to the assumption that all but a 1 /4 fraction of the correct nodes know g string . Such an assumption can be ensured by the use of the protocol presented in [KSSV06] , as mentioned in the introduction.
Finally, as in [LSP82] , we consider a non-adaptive adversary: corrupt nodes are chosen before the algorithm is executed.
Complexity.
We consider two metrics for the complexity of the algorithm:
• Time complexity is the number of steps taken before all correct nodes return an agreement value.
• Communication complexity is the total number of exchanged bits (in worst case) divided by the number of nodes. is is called amortized ⁵ complexity, and is the same as worst case complexity for load-balanced algorithms.
Furthermore, we use theÕ notation, which is the same as O, up to a poly-logarithmic factor.
Samplers
Like [KLST11, KKK + , CD89], our work relies on the notion of samplers. e intuition is as follows:
• if nodes choose deterministically the nodes they contact, either there are a linear number of them (thus Ω (n) communication complexity) or there are few enough for the adversary to corrupt a majority; • if uniformly-random sets (called quorums) are chosen, the byzantine nodes can follow the algorithm, but contact many disjoint sets, which would then need communicate amongst quorums: again, this yields unreasonably high worst-case complexity.
Samplers are a middle ground, in the sense that the choice of quorums is directed by both deterministically-known information (like the identity of a node), and random sources (either a local RNG⁶ or g string , which is known almost-everywhere).
Definitions.
First, we introduce some notations:
• [n] denotes the set of integers from 1 to n.
• [n] d is the set of size d strings, with elements in
• is the domain of random labels, used in our algorithm. Its cardinal, R, is polynomial.
D  ([KLST]). A function : X → Y is a (θ, δ)-sampler if for any set S ⊆ Y at most a δ fraction of the inputs x have
We define H (i, x) = (i · n + x) for i ∈ and x ∈ [n]: e separation in two variables will be used to define push quorums and pull quorums (Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2). Furthermore, we denote by H −1 (i, x) the set of nodes y such that x ∈ H (i, y). A node x is said to be overloaded by H (for some constant
Lemmata.
e following lemma is about the existence of samplers:
We further use the following lemma:
⁵Note that the amortization is over the set of nodes, not time. However, average complexity would refer to averaging over possible (random) runs of the algorithm. ⁶Random Number Generator, assumed uniformly-random and private 
L  (S .). For with cardinality polynomial in n,
there exists d = O (log n) such that there is a mapping J : [n] × → [n] d such that for any subset of [n] of size (1/2 + ϵ) · n,
For any
Property 1 comes from [KLST11] , and forbids the Byzantine adversary from corrupting too many potential quorums. Property 2 is a novel property that prevents the Byzantine adversary from "cornering" a set of nodes and isolate it from the rest of the network. It is used in Algorithms 2 and 3.
Pulls and Pushes
In our context, it is convenient to model communication as pushes and pulls, two ways according to which a node x can get information.
A push occurs when x receives information from other nodes without asking for it, whereas in a pull, x sends a request to one or more other nodes, and receives information as a consequence. Notice that nodes may ignore pushes and pull requests. Pushes have the advantage of requiring less communication. On the other hand, a node receiving a push has not selected the sender, enabling Byzantine nodes to flood the network.
In this work, we design filters according to which push requests are accepted, preventing the Byzantine nodes from harming AER:
• When pull requests are initiated by x, it yields some guarantees on the nodes to which pull requests are addressed. Here, they are selected randomly, ensuring w.h.p. (with high probability) a majority of correct nodes.
• As in [KS09] , pull requests are filtered to prevent Byzantine nodes from triggering too many replies (poor worst case complexity).
ALMOST EVERYWHERE TO EVERYWHERE
e almost-everywhere to everywhere problem [KS09] consists of propagating a piece g string of information that is detained by many nodes to all nodes of the system. e main contribution of this paper is an algorithm which solves this problem w.h.p. with amortized communication complexityÕ (1) under the hypothesis that g string is c log n bits long for some large enough constant c, and that 2 /3 + ϵ of its bits are uniformly random.
Together with the algorithm presented in [KSSV06] , AER yields a Byzantine Agreement protocol, noted BA, with amortized complexitỹ O (1).
Overview of our protocol
Preconditions.
AER enables all the nodes to agree on a common string called g string , under two assumptions. First, all nodes must share three sampling functions: I , H and J :
• I defines the Push Quorums used to diffuse candidate strings.
Lemma 1 yields a (θ, δ)-
• H define Pull Quorums with the same properties;
• J generates Poll Lists during the pull phase.
It has the properties described in Lemma 2.
Secondly, each node x knows a candidate s x :
• s x can be equal to g string , random, set to a default value, or even chosen by the adversary.
• However, more than half of the nodes must be correct and know g string , i.e. they have s x = g string . Under the assumption that t < ( 1 /3−ϵ)· n, it is equivalent to assume that 3 /4 of the correct nodes know g string .
• g string is c log n bits long for some large enough constant c, and 2 /3 + ϵ of its bits were chosen uniformly at random.
The protocol.
AER proceeds in two phases:
Push is first phase consists of several pushes which provide each node x with a list L x of at most O (n) candidates for g string , containing g string w.h.p. is phase has a message complexity of O (n), and the sum of the sizes of the lists is O (n), amortizing to O (1) per node. Pull Each node x sends a pull query to a set of sample nodes to verify each candidate s ∈ L x , to find g string . We will show how to answer the pull queries, so as to identify g string without having high worst case complexity.
Push
To each pair of string s and node x, the sampler I assigns a set of O (log n) nodes. x may receive pushes for s from nodes in I (s, x): the Push Quorum of x according to s. If more than half of the nodes of I (s , x) push for s, s is added to x's candidates list, L x .
Since nodes do not react to the reception of messages by sending messages, this phase is impervious to flooding: the adversary cannot increase the communication complexity of this phase by sending many candidate strings to all nodes.
However, flooding may increase the number of candidate strings for each node. e filter defined by I prevents this: Lemma 4 states that the sum of the size of the candidate list is O (n), while Lemma 3 implies that the number of messages sent during the first phase by any good node isÕ (1).
In Figure 2a , a node x adds a string s 1 to its list of candidate strings (which originally contains only s x , its initial candidate string), and ignores another string s 2 . Indeed x receives s 1 from more than half of the nodes of I (x, s 1 ), while it receives s 2 from less than half of the nodes of I (x, s 2 ).
Pull
Checking a string s involves simultaneously a Poll List J (x, r x ) (where r x is taken at random) which is deemed authoritative, and Pull Quorums of the form H (·, s). ey can be seen as proxies, used to forward and filter x's pull requests, so as to prevent it from flooding the network.
In Figure 2b , a node x performs a pull request to verify a string s ∈ L x . An arrow to a quorum represents a message sent to all the nodes of the quorum, and similarly, an arrow from a quorum means that all the correct nodes of the quorum send the message. 
Sending queries.
As formalized in Algorithm 1, each node x verifies each string s ∈ L x by polling a set of nodes:
• x chooses a random string r x,s to define the Poll List J (x, r x,s ).
A different random string is used for each candidate string. • x sends a pull request (containing r x,s ) to the Poll List J (x, r x,s ) and its Pull Quorum H (s , x).
Answering.
is second part corresponds to Algorithms 2 and 3.
• A node y ∈ H (s, x) forwards a request received from x iff s is its initial candidate string (s y ). e request is forwarded to the nodes in J (x, r x ) through their Pull Quorums.
• A node z in the Pull Quorum of w ∈ J (x, r x ) (z ∈ H (s, w)) forwards the request to w iff s = s z and z received the request from more than half of the nodes of H (s, x). • Finally, a node w ∈ J (x, r x ) replies to a pull request from x if:
1. the pull request was received from a majority of H (s, w); 2. either it one of its pull requests was answered (thus w knows g string w.h.p.), and s w was changed accordingly; 3. or it currently has received less than log 2 n pull requests.
If x receives answers from a majority of nodes in J (x, r x ), s is deemed to be the global string.
ANALYSIS OF AER
In this section, we prove that AER brings all correct nodes to agree on g string w.h.p., with poly-logarithmic time and space complexity; but first, we must prove Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 2
In this section, we use graph theoretic considerations in order to prove Lemma 2: 
L 2. For with cardinality polynomial in n, there exists d = O (log n) such that there is a mapping
J : [n] × → [n] d such that x L x = {s x , s 1 } I (x, s 2 ) I (x, s 1 ) (a) Push to a node x w 1 w 2 w 3 y 3 y 2 y 1 x J (x, r x ) H (s, x) H (s , w 1 ) H (s, w 2 ) H (s, w 3 ) (b) Pull request from a node x
For any
Henceforth, these properties will be called Properties 1 and 2. In [KLST11] , Lemma 4 state that Property 1 happen with probability at least 1 /2.
In the following subsection, we show that Property 2 holds w.h.p. It follows that, for all n big enough, there is a digraph satisfying both properties; this proves Lemma 2.
We use a graph-based formulation adapted from [Zuc97] , which is a powerful tool for proving the existence of a family of samplers. We use ∂ L, a notion similar to the border of a subgraph, defined as follow.
In other words, ∂ L is the set of edges from the labeled vertices in L to the unlabeled vertices in [n] \ L ⊥ . Given this, we use a metric
closely related to the isoperimetric number [Bol88] :
e digraph G we consider (which is illustrated in the following figure) is taken uniformly such that:
E ⊆ ([n] × ) × [n]: a vertex (labeled with a point in ) is
connected to unlabeled vertices.
3. E is uniformly random; it implies that edges are chosen independently.
Let P (u, s) be the probability that there is a set
Result.
satisfies Property 2 with probability 1 − o(n 2 2 −n ).
Proof
Since edges are taken uniformly, we can fix the set L ⊂ [n] × and have:
Enumeration.
We consider u vertices with d edges, which makes n d ·u possibilities for the edges.
ere are
s sets E such that our property holds:
• We must choose u labels with values in :
there are R u possibilities.
• We must choose s edges (amongst the d · u in U ) that will be in ∂ U .
• ese s edges go to vertices in [n] \ L ⊥ : there are (n − u) s possibilities.
• e remaining vertices are connected to nodes in P :
Upper bound on the probability.
We can now upper-bound P (u, s):
because α P. By the definition of I (Lemma 1), no node is overloaded. Hence, each correct node y sends its candidate string to O (log n) nodes, namely the nodes x such that y ∈ I (s y , x). erefore, during the Push, the number of messages sent by any correct nodes is O (log n), each containing a string having the same size as g string .
L 4. e sum of the sizes of the candidates list of the correct nodes is O (n).
P. A node y accepts a candidate string s iff more than half of the nodes of I (s, y) sent it. By assumption, 1 /2+ϵ fraction of the nodes are both correct and have g string as initial string. erefore, since I is a sampler, at most O (n) quorums have a majority of nodes sending a string different from g string . ese quorums inject at most O (n) wrong strings (in total) to the lists of candidate strings of the correct nodes. erefore the sum of the size of the candidates list is O (n).
L 5. ere is a constant c such that, when g string is c log n bits long, and 2 /3 + ϵ of the bits are uniformly random, w.h.p. each node of the system has g string in its candidate list at the end of the Push phase.
P. Looking at the Input Quorums, since I is a sampler, whatever are the nodes corrupted by the adversary and the knowledgeable nodes, at most O (n) of the quorums do not have an correct and knowledgeable majority. If a node x does not have g string in its candidate list L x , it means that I (g string , x) does not have an correct and knowledgeable majority; we call such an Input Quorum bad. It is sufficient to prove that the probability of I (g string , x) to be bad is negligible.
g string has length c log n for some constant c (that we choose thereafter), and the Byzantine nodes generate a 1 /3 − ϵ fraction of its bits. Among all the choices, O (n c ) of them lead to good Input Quorums for all of the nodes of the network, and O (n) lead to at least one bad Input Quorum. e probability for a chosen string to match a specific string leading to a bad Input Quorums is upper bounded by 2 − 2 /3·c log n . By the union bound over the n such strings, we get that the probability to choose one of them is less than n −c ′ for some constant 0 < c ′ < 2 /3c. From this, we conclude that each correct node has g string in its candidate list with probability greater than 1 − n −c ′ .
Pull phase
It now remains to analyze the pull phase.
L 6. Any polling request (for g string ) is answered in O log n log log n time steps.
P. A node receives a message from an correct node in its poll list iff it is not overloaded or if it has already received an answer from a majority of nodes in its pull request. Now, notice that to overload a node x whose original string g string , the adversary must have O log 2 n of its nodes to send a pull request to x. is pull request will be considered by x iff it is for g string . ere-fore, the adversary must send O log 2 n pull requests corresponding to g string . But then, w.h.p., the quorum associated to g string are all correct, which implies that the adversary can send pull requests at most once for each node it controls, as otherwise the pull requests will not be forwarded by the associated quorums. erefore, the adversary can overload O n log n nodes with request associated to g string (each node can send O (log n) requests, and a node is overloaded if it receives more than log 2 n requests). e adversary can also overload a node x whose original string is s ̸ = g string and that was chosen by the adversary. But to overload such a node, the adversary need to corrupt the quorum H (x, s ) and H (a, s) for log 2 n nodes a controlled by the adversary, as otherwise the pull requests would not be forwarded. erefore, in this case also, the adversary can overload at most O n log n nodes. e adversary knows⁷ the nodes to which pull requests are addressed, before choosing its own pull requests. erefore, it can overload all the nodes x ′ to which a given node x has sent pull requests. It can further overload all the nodes to which all x ′ have sent their pull requests and so on.
From the properties of J , we know that each set L of at most n log n nodes send at least 2 /3 · d | L | pull requests to nodes outside L. is implies that by overloading n log n nodes, the adversary can at most overload a sequence of length O log n log log n in such a way. ere-⁷In the asynchronous (or synchronous rushing) model; the case of the (less general) synchronous model with non-rushing adversary is addressed in Lemma 8.
fore, in O log n log log n steps, each node receives answer from its pull requests.
L 7. Any node decides on g string w.h.p.
P. ere are two ways for a node not to decide on g string :
1. its poll request for g string isn't answered; 2. a poll request for another string s was answered first.
Lemma 6 ensures that, w.h.p., 1. does not happen. Assuming x decides on s, then J (x, r x ) is composed in majority of nodes that are either Byzantine or that decided on s. Taking the first node to decide on s, the sample J (x, r x ) must be composed mostly of Byzantine nodes. W.h.p. this doesn't happen, because r x is uniformly random, J is a sampler, and the adversary chose the Byzantine nodes before r x was chosen. P. If the adversary is not rushing, it does not know which nodes an correct node address its pull requests to. erefore, w.h.p., each correct node pulls a majority of nodes that are both correct and not overloaded. It follows that w.h.p. each correct node receives an answer in a constant number of steps.
Result
From this we obtain the following two lemmata: L 9. For n nodes in a synchronous full information message passing model with a non-adaptive non-rushing Byzantine adversary which controls less than a 1 /3 − ϵ fraction of the nodes, if more than 3 /4 of the correct nodes know a string g string (random enough), there is an algorithm such that w.h.p.:
• At the end of the algorithm, each correct node knows g string .
• e algorithm takes O (1) rounds andÕ (n) messages are exchanged in total.
L 10. For n nodes in a asynchronous full information message passing model with a non-adaptive Byzantine adversary which controls less than a 1 /3 − ϵ fraction of the nodes, if more than 3 /4 of the correct nodes know a string g string (random enough), there is an algorithm such that w.h.p.:
• e algorithm takes O log n log log n rounds andÕ (n) messages are exchanged in total.
Note that, to obtain an amortized communication complexity of O (1), the condition that the algorithm is load-balanced was relaxed.
CONCLUSION
We propose an asynchronous almost-everywhere to everywhere agreement protocol with poly-logarithmic complexity, which yields the first poly-logarithmic algorithm for Byzantine Agreement. Future work could focus on almost-everywhere Agreement, for which no efficient asynchronous protocol is known. Another interesting and challenging question is to find the best complexity that is achievable by a loadbalanced algorithm in the general case, and -more generally -characterize the trade-off between load-balancing and communication complexity.
